General David Petraeus may have been the editor-in-chief of the military’s counterinsurgency manual. But it was General Stanley McChrystal who put in place some of the book’s most radical precepts about limiting the use of force. Now that Petraeus has replaced McChrystal as the front-line commander in Afghanistan, we’ll see if he rolls back McChrystal-style counterinsurgency in favor of something more like what Petraeus practiced in Iraq.
When McChrystal took over as Afghanistan’s top general, he put limits on night raids, and curbed pursuits into populated villages. Most famously and dramatically, McChrystal severely restricted the use of air power — America’s biggest technological advantage in the war.
The bombs were causing too many civilian casualties, he reasoned. And as the counterinsurgency (COIN) manual noted, “an airstrike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory.”
The manual added: “Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.”
To get an airstrike approved in advance, ground commanders under McChrystal needed to provide multiple sources of intelligence showing that there were no civilians around, proof that there was no other way to go after a target, and a plan to justify the bombing to the locals. Not surprisingly, these requirements rarely came together.
The only bombs that got dropped were those used to protect “troops in contact” — forces in a firefight. And those airstrike requests were granted only after careful consideration.
Battlefield pleas were even turned down when there were no innocents in the area, because of the harm to civilian property. Over all, the number of “munitions expenditures” dropped in half as soon as McChrystal issued his new directive.
The trend line went in the opposite direction, after Petraeus took over the Iraq war in January 2007. Under his leadership, special-operations raids were common. The lethal Task Force ODIN allegedly had a hand in 2,400 insurgents’ deaths. And during 2007, Air Force pilots flew 1,447 sorties that involved dropping munitions. The year before, they flew just 229 of those sorties — about 15 percent of of 2007’s total.
Iraq then was much more violent place than Afghanistan is today. And it demanded a more violent response, the commander believed. As Petraeus told me at the time, the COIN manual “doesn’t say that the best weapons don’t shoot. It says sometimes the best weapons don’t shoot. Sometimes the best weapons do shoot.”
McChrystal’s strict guidelines triggered all kinds of grumbling from frontline troops, who felt hampered in their ability to fight the Taliban. Whether or not Petraeus eases those restrictions is one of many questions to be answered, as McChrystal’s version of COIN gives way to the Petraeus practice.
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